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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper examines relationships between theory of financial risk and size. Based on the work 
of Makridakis / Taleb [2009] and Taleb / Tapiero [2009], presents the problems of excessive 
risk and imbalances caused by the size of firms. Markets mixed on firm growth traps 
externalities can influence risk, high-cost for the commons. A policy of regulation and control in 
markets, while necessary, are still insufficient in economies with little institutional support. 
Externalities of risk and firm size categories are fundamental to understanding the present 
financial crisis since the economies of scale. 
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The problem 
The conditions proposed by the financial crisis and international markets have ended up 
affecting the practice of economies and shared frames of reference on the nature of the 
problems. A minor phenomenon in Bangladesh can have substantial impacts in New York or 
London. The scale and size categories have become central to the analysis of what is happening. 
Institutional sizes are related to risk externalities [Makridakis / Taleb, 2009]. The work 
produced [Haug, 2007; May, 2008] offer an explanation of the consequences to take extreme 
risks in economies (extreme risk). Even considering the risk corresponds to the capital 
(original) external losses can become outrageous
1
. 
 
Background 
Studies reveal a context in which larger firms may fail [Bounchaud, 2003; DeMiguel, 2007]. 
Even estimating the expected losses for the risk and available capital externalities are not fully 
insured. Under these conditions, the problems arising outperform the markets and stock 
exchanges. It is rapidly advancing issues affecting the stability of many countries and the 
quality of life of their populations. What is experienced is a financial uncertainty that 
compromises the overall governance. Witnessing phenomena whose nature is causal [Popper, 
1935] in extended networks with large faults [Taleb, 2009] that depend on the sizes of markets 
and types of risk. 
These failures in financial markets do not come from small firms and medium-sized 
industrial estate. Size is important to study the risk because the market relationships will expose 
a greater volume of interest may be affected. The size of financial language reflects economies 
of scale. Something likes the dangers of investment in trade during the time of Adam 
Smith.  
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 This paper is part of a larger review to [Makridakis / Taleb, 2009] and [Taleb / Tapiero 2009]. The 
conditions that created the current financial crisis have also been appropriate to demonstrate the need for 
the financial world and the conventional economic theories recognize errors of principle. Based on solid 
empirical evidence the authors re-discover an empirical tradition / mathematics that emerges from Hume, 
Popper, Kahneman and Mandelbrot, to suggest an epistemology with remarkable trajectory of future 
applications and consistent. 
Size and risk externalities   
However, the analogies in economic history have their own limits. In the economies of scale we 
find a considerable growth of trade and finance industry. The sizes can overwhelm the ability of 
firms to cover the risks. Cases such as General Motors GM contended complex and diversified 
growth with high risk externalities can now be compared with the portfolios of pension funds 
(Mutual fund portfolio). They have grown in size with risks that exceed their ability to repay 
any financial turmoil [Dubofsky, 2009]. 
 
Unlike the industrial and commercial banks have severe regulatory restrictions; the 
confidence of its depositors is to obtain optimal yields. The bank failures for this tend to 
produce greater impact in the context of society, because undermine public confidence. In a 
majority of cases the banks do not take the externalities of risk (risk externalities). However, 
for those who manage banks (often the case) the growth in size of the data does not correspond 
to the estimate of potential losses. Moreover, short-sighted measures, those lead to most banks 
to exercise powers in illegal financial markets. The rules of "punishment" may have a variable 
nature regarding the quantity and quality of expenditures reported "formal" firms.  
 
The size (size) is important because it can lead firms to take risks that over time become 
unsustainable. Is the case where bank shares offer short-term yields at the expense of the 
possibility of quantifying externalities risk depositors. We know in theory that express 
externalities market failure. When banks get too big, the risk factors become superior. For 
example, Frank Rich (The New York Times, Goldman Can You Spare a Dime, October 18, 
2009) has drawn attention to the fact that "Wall Street manages the rules in Washington." 
Similarly R. Winkler (Reuter) indicated that "Wall Street has almost all the benefits”. 
 
A recent study by the National Academy of Sciences in the United States has denounced 
excessive risks and hidden costs of the energy industry: costs not borne by the industry but the 
general public. But it is governments that receive public trust and not the banks. Banks have 
created with the aim of providing better conditions for successful transactions and manage 
credit lines. All this requires the functioning of financial markets. A deterioration of this trust 
has depended on the expansion of financial proposals with unforeseeable risks on their public 
impact. The crisis resulting from the excessive size of the banking sector has also contributed to 
increased externality (negative) with costs experienced by most people. 
In this regard Taleb / Tapiero [2009] consider that it is inefficient markets with negative 
externalities to a considerable extent, even though they have ideal conditions of competition 
(perfect financial markets). In any firm if negative externalities are not offset by positive 
externalities, or adequately regulated, the risk of losses can become outrageous. In a New York 
Times (Sunday Business section, October 4, 2009), Gretchen Morgension referring to research 
by Dean Baker and Travis McArthur, described the effects of selective failures that allowed 
some privileged banks (large) were "subsidized" with costs above $ 34 million.  
 
Size is not the medicine when firms fail. For example, Fujian [2004], using a list of broken 
Japanese companies in 1997 ([Bouchaud, 2003]) has drawn the failure of some firms regardless 
of size. When business growth is supported by debt to risk exposed is superior because it 
threatens both the creditor losses as the lender. Size growth combined with rising debt can lead 
to colossal failures. It's like traveling with suicide pilots that guide aircraft dynamited. By taking 
unsustainable growth strategies with negative externalities, people end up paying higher costs. 
 
Networks and supply chains 
When the size is based on the consistency of the networks (networks) (as large supply chains), 
risks in the chain (See [Tapiero, 2007], and [Konstantin / Tapiero, 2007]) may contribute to 
higher costs maintenance of industrial and financial organizations. Saito [2007] examines 
corporate networks and shows how, unlike small firms-tend to have large inter-corporate 
relationships. Therefore are exposed to increasing risks. A case in point was the Toyota with the 
purchase of products and raw materials to a large number of signatures that led the company to 
maintain close relationships with numerous investment banks trade. So it required a similar 
organization with a considerable number of affiliates. 
 
When the networks increased dependence on supply chain risks are also increasing 
gradually. But this interdependence is difficult when the provider can control a critical part in 
the network and necessary for the proper functioning of firms. For example, a small plant in 
Normandy (France), not more than 100 employees could put in check the complex of the 
Renault company. Similarly, a small group of Spanish merchants may decide to "significant 
market failures" which ultimately affect economic policies throughout the state. These growths 
in the network are both the result and the conditions for growth in large scale enterprises (see 
also [Bouchaud / Potters, 2003). 
Alexsiejuk and Holystar [2001] performed experiments simulated by constructing a simple 
model of bank failures using network filtering mechanisms for cooperative banks (see, theory of 
filtration [Goldenberg / Solomon / Jan / Stauffer, 2000]. The simulation has shown that bank 
withdrawals "sporadic" may have dramatic effects on the stability of the system and lead to 
bankruptcy if the bank does not receive the aid. But the bank failure may trigger a systemic 
crisis contagious process that eventually destroys financial structure. Moral support: not only in 
theory but in practice, major economic decisions and the moral costs of externalities are 
associated with risk. All of this means that despite the current focus of financial policy to the 
protection industrial conglomerates (also benefiting from the subsidies) affect the risk 
dimensions universal range of public goods. 
 
Who pays?  
So the firm size matters, as they provide a safety net and a guarantee to the authorities and 
governments, whatever their politics, their survival is secured at the expense of public funding. 
The strategic practice, economies of scale often leads to costly mistakes. It should be noted with 
the fallacies of composition while disclosing the new prophets of growth: that size does not 
matter, that no matter the extension of business. The truth is that both the moral cost 
externalities are significant in monetary terms. Measures to prevent risks when the size of firms 
has grown can hardly be quantified. 
 
The question is whether economies of scale may offset the risk to savers' deposits. A 
similar issue has been recognized implicitly in the proposals of the Obama administration, 
congressional committees requesting the banks have more capital than one who can assume the 
losses. The larger the bank should be more regulations on their capitals (New York Times, July 
27, 2009, Editorial). However, the laws do not fully protect public money from the externalities 
of risk created by the banks. In a majority of cases, bank failures, terms assume the people who 
pay their taxes.  
 
In assessing the effects of size and risk factors, Taleb / Tapiero [2009] choose a 
significant example of firms that can get to the disappearance of their capitals. Not that these 
firms can exhibit reasonable limits on their losses, and have warned that risks to people 
exposed. The case addressed by these authors can be seen that extreme risk exposures (short-
sighted profit-motivated) may trigger losses are directly related to the size of the banks. 
 Limits of regulation  
These considerations may provide a (partial) of the severe difficulties and imbalances caused by 
problems of size and externality in the financial and economic crisis. A way back to the paths 
opened by Coase and Pareto. Economic globalization has deceptive traps, one of them is the 
growth and firm size. The current crisis in financial markets is a good illustration. When major 
pollutants are wrong conditions conducive to their partner networks become death traps. 
Because of its size a firm may be tempted to bet on "big" due to its speculative position in the 
markets. The speculative position is preferred for the appearance of the black swan (in the 
fortunate epistemology Taleb [2008] and [2009]).  
 
Insurance companies can act to protect its customers against risk of loss (limited). But 
when the sizes of such losses exceed the standards and laws set these controls are inefficient. 
Precisely because of its exaggerated characteristics, markets require greater controls on the sizes 
of firms and greater controls by governments. These aspects are investing successful narrative 
of globalization, because the social costs of the risks go way too high. Social costs in turn are 
related to moral hazard (moral hazard). The largest case loads in all reside in people. 
 
The regulation, however, is a chimera when markets are speculative. This is most 
evident when markets earn with money from dubious sources (capital of drug trafficking, for 
example). Under these conditions the externalities of risk to investors end up affecting obeying 
the laws. Relying on efficient market regulation may have contradictory effects. The control 
systems can end up shaking the financial innovation and reducing incentives for efficient 
movement of capital in the markets.  Are the effects of negative externalities in the so-called 
economies of scale? In his line of argument [Coase] would say that the problems are not a bank 
or any particular fund, but combined and simultaneous actions. 
 
 
Among Coase and Pareto  
Then things work as follows. In the financial sector have at least three key components: the 
stock exchange, banks and governments. Banks and stock exchanges were set up for maximum 
profits that are distributed among its clients. Governments should protect people and establish 
control systems that give confidence. In cases (which are few) when governments can 
demonstrate financial iniquities of the banks against their customers, or speculation that damage 
public confidence, have an obligation to punish those responsible exemplary.  
Ideally the risks of negative externalities condition the economies of Pareto efficient 
solutions [quoted by Taleb, 2008], the rights of investors are protected by governments and the 
obligations of the banks are so transparent. However, as stressed by [Ferguson, 2007] illegal 
profits and salaries of financial executives are not things that happen in a la Leibniz world. In 
our polluted world domains are a la Hobbes choice. It means that any speculator to advantage in 
the markets may expose ruin a majority of gullible customers. Well look at these authors [Taleb 
/ Tapiero, 2009] that when the banking risks have a probability distribution of extreme, shared 
losses also come to be extreme. And when the risks outweigh reasonable measures, the Pareto 
distribution is only a false comfort.  
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